Researching contemporary epistemological and pedagogical theories on teaching composition has illuminated a bleak, undefined, subjective world. It is a world in which we are more than entitled our personal beliefs—we are entitled to our own personal realities. Because perception creates what is real, there is no longer an objective Reality or Truth. Language becomes more than a tool—more than a means to an end. Language becomes truth—and the fact that different versions of truth must differ in this scenario—does not matter. Objective Truth and Reality are, according to James Berlin, “beyond the resources of language;” therefore, what is true and real is created by the perceptions and reflections we have of the world around us (”Contemporary Composition” 771). From a teacher’s perspective, this is almost too much to grapple with. One such theory of this philosophy applied to teaching composition is James Berlin’s “Epistemic Rhetoric.” This philosophy does not seem compatible with best pedagogical practices and curriculum. Best practices and curriculum should center around preparing students to interact thoughtfully and critically with the global community. Berlin’s philosophy only prepares students to interact, giving them tools of language and rhetoric that manipulate meaning and create false realities.
Any discussion, Postmodern or otherwise, on composition and teaching practices must first begin with language. Berlin postulates that the use of language allows us to perceive and reflect, which creates reality for the agent who perceives and reflects (”James Berlin Responds” 85). Therefore, if I see a table, name it, understand the concept, and then reflect on it, I have, in essence created the table in my own personal reality. And if another person sees the table, but does not truly perceive it, then it does not exist in their reality. Berlin fails to consider a very important difference between subjective reality, which is valid in its own right, and objective reality, which does not change, regardless of any other extenuating circumstances. This point is best illustrated in the divergent opinions regarding Climate Change. Science has provided ample evidence to prove the increase of the global temperature worldwide, as a result of green house gas accumulation in our atmosphere. It is a hotly debated topic—as many people refuse to believe that humans have had such a catastrophic impact on the state of our biosphere. This subject can be argued over for an indeterminate amount of time, and one’s acknowledgement of the facts of Climate Change does not change the objective reality that pollution is damaging Earth. Although the concept of Climate Change is not reality for some, the lack of recognition of objective reality shows that there can be a serious difference between subjective and objective reality.
Referring back to the table metaphor, regardless of subjective perception of the material world, a table will always be a table whether or not it is recognized. Berlin is right, however, giving much credit to language, concepts and how we perceive them. Subjectively, the table does not have meaning or importance or relevance until it is recognized by an interlocutor, to use Berlin’s term, who assigns definition, value, and meaning through language—because then, it exists in our world, for our ends, and in our reality. If we do not acknowledge it, or cannot acknowledge it, its existence is irrelevant because we do not have the concepts to discuss it. It is important to note, however, that language, and our perception and reflection of it, does not create the table, it gives us the means to use it.
In the scenarios Berlin envisions, problems arising out of two different interpretations of the same object wouldn’t be problematic—in fact, contradictions of this nature are bound to happen. Berlin likens this contradiction between two differing perceptions of signifiers and the signified to Hegelian synthesis. For Berlin, two opposing meanings create an opportunity for “new meanings to emerge as contradictory ideas interact” (”James Berlin Responds” 85). He goes onto propose in the same paragraph that this “dialectical opposition prevents radical relativism,” explaining that a system of checks and balances exists in the world of language and composition: “The interlocutor is – simultaneously – engaged in a dialectical relationship with the material world (reality), the taking part (the audience), and a set of ideas brought to the total experience (language)” (”James Berlin Responds” 85). The theory that radical relativism will be kept at bay by the material world, “a community of discussants,” and the language rules particular to that community, fails to take into account several things. First, Berlin’s concept of a “community of discussants” as being able to regulate any anomalous writing/ideas within a community isn’t failsafe because there is no hierarchy of ideas within Berlin’s philosophy. To hope that a community self-regulates and comes to a logical, positive consensus without any outside influence, is overly idealistic and naVve. The Nazi regime was a “community of discussants” who failed to regulate the languages, ideas, and rhetoric produced. Instead of a Hegelian synthesis of Nazi rhetoric and another, less insane rhetoric, the Nazi rhetoric dominated and the rest is history.
Another aspect of Berlin’s checks on radical perspectives is the relationship between the interlocutor and the material world. Berlin himself views the material world as unable to provide unadulterated Truth or Reality because it is necessary for the interlocutor to perceive and interact with the material world in order to give it relevance and meaning. If that is the case, then it becomes unclear as to how he expects the material world to act as a check on interpretations of the material world. Also, people can refuse to accept or acknowledge the material world—as well as refusing to interact within a community of discussants or abide by language rules. Because there is no standard of knowledge, discourse, reality, or truth, it seems as though anyone putting much stock into the Postmodern perspective would fall between the cracks of Berlin’s checks and balances system. This system has no incentive to engage in community, or in a community amongst other communities. Because of the importance placed on freedom of perspective expression and understanding, as well as freedom within the bounds of the material world, a community, and language, Berlin’s philosophy is relative instead of tolerant.
The goal, according to Berlin, is to prepare students:
for the diversity of writing tasks they will face while in college and afterward in their professional lives. [Students] come to realize that writing in different rhetorical situations requires becoming accustomed to different views of reality, divergent discourse communities, a variety of evidential rules, and differing languages and conceptions of language. (”James Berlin Responds” 8 
Berlin fails to take into account the dangers of not differentiating between subjective and objective realities. If no standard exists, hoping that teaching rhetoric as a way to interact instead of manipulate or completely disregard every other reality because theirs is superior seems dangerously naVve. The epistemic rhetoric aims to equip students to interact and communicate within their OWN community, in their OWN environment, and with their OWN language rules—as a best case scenario. Any discourse between communities, which from a teacher’s standpoint is one of the ultimate goals, is not authentic discourse, as discussants adopt the ideals, beliefs, realities, languages, etc. of the others without engaging in critical thinking or analysis of what they’re adopting or who they’re interacting with.
Critical thinking and analysis of ideas is the foundation for good pedagogy and curriculum, as teachers ought to be preparing students to interact thoughtfully within a global community. Good writing is more than effective communication, which Berlin’s epistemic rhetoric definitely accomplishes—good writing effectively communicates worthwhile and necessary ideas and concepts. Writing also forces the writer to commit to the particular language and ideas they abide by and be willing to subject the piece of writing to thoughtful engagement and analysis by a community. Berlin’s epistemic rhetoric requires neither thinking nor analysis of the piece of writing, the discussion that creates it, or that occurs as a result of the piece of writing. Instead, Berlin hopes to gives students the tools of “writing”—in the simplest sense of the word, instead of instilling in students the ability to think, analyze, or critique.
Works Cited
Berlin, James A. “Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories.” College English. Vol. 44, No. 8. (December 1982) pp. 765-777.
— “James Berlin Responds.” College English. Vol. 46, No. 1. (Jan. 1984) pp. 85-88.
Ervin, Elizabeth. “Epistemology.” Keywords in Composition. Eds. Heilker & Vandenberg. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook Publishers: 1996. pp. 76-80.
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